DWORKIN'S READING
'command's "eaua/" protection of tne Jaws, and" a7so command; tnat neifner /i/e nor Yiberty nor property be faAen witnout Wue' process of 7a*y.' (R Dworkin, freed'om's law; p. 72) 
PURSUING A THIRD WAY
The preamble helps Dworkin in that it provides a reading of the Constitution in terms of principles. It unmistakably specifies the general purposes for which the Constitution exists, by doing so provides principles, and these clearly require interpretation. That interpretation cannot be the one based on 'original intention', because these principles are so general that they defy limitation to any specific reference. The preamble was manifestly intended to have general significance, and to have indefinite duration, so that its original intention does not narrow down its content to a specific form. Indeed, it can provide grounds to amend the content of the Articles of the Constitution, because those Articles are terms to the objectives that it prescribes.
At the same time, the preamble is a hindrance to the 'moral reading' in the form Dworkin develops. He says that the Constitution includes 'abstract principles o^ poAtica/ moraAty'. But this is not a plausible reading of the Articles of 1787 or the Bill of Rights. The Articles consist of institutional stipulations while the Bill of Rights, besides these, consists of o prohibitions and denials, and certainly refers to or enumerates rights, but does not prescribe them (with the exceptions that we have seen). Neither do the subsequent Amendments alter the picture, for they likewise make prohibitions and specify institutional requirements. In short, the Bill of Rights, pace Dworkin, does not set out 'a network o/ principles' (p. 73) in his sense of 'principle', that is to say prescriptive assertions of general moral truths; neither do the other Amendments or the original Articles, for none of them 'set out' principles of this sort. In Dworkin's sense, the only principles in the Constitution are those specified by the preamble.
As the preamble specifies the purposes for which the Constitution exists, it is hard to see how one can include within its scope anything that does not fall, explicitly or implicitly, under the purposes specified. Each category of the preamble, however, like the commandment, 'is exceeding broad'. Dworkin's principles may be brought within the remit provided by the preamble, but this is not to say that the preamble fits his manner of advancing them.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The Constitution nominates its own concerns in its preamble. We may need to supply further principles in order to articulate these, but the principles which the document itself provides do not correspond to all of Dworkin's headings of liberty, equality and community. Liberty is certainly present both in the preamble and in Dworkin, but equality and community are not given as
categories by the former. However, they might be brought under its principles by some interpretative work. Thus the categories of 'general Welfare* and o c* 'Justice' might be interpreted in order to accommodate respectively community and equality. The interpretation is unlikely to be easy, however, because the relationship between justice and equality is, by any view, an involved one. Of course, we may need considerations of a higher generality than the principles of the preamble in order to rank or reconcile the latter if their requirements conflict, but it is not obvious that the members of Dworkin's trinity of liberal concern can fill this role plausibly: how could they regulate 'general Tranquility' and 'common defence'?
Rather, political morality needs to follow the categories of the preamble, and not the other way around, as it would in the Dworkin version (if the preamble figured at all there, which it does not). This is not to say that the Constitution requires no interpretation, but to observe the considerations that should govern the interpreting. For instance, the question ceases to be about whether the First Amendment is to be interpreted in terms of the principle 'fAat if is m-on^ Jor government to censor or control wAat inJiW Jua/ citizens say or pubAsA', as Dworkin hoped, and becomes a question, first, about which principle of the preamble the content of the Amendment fits appropriately here, the answer is plainly 'secure fAe ^/essin^s oj liberty'; secondly, about what 'Blessings' and 'Liberty' mean and, thirdly, about the sense or senses of 'tAe^reeJom o/ speecA, or o^tAe press' and whether they fall within the limits of 'the Blessings of Liberty'. The practical conclusions that flow from this are likely to differ from Dworkin's: few would maintain that pornography or neo-Nazi rallies, which he defends whilst he deplores, are 'Blessings of Liberty'.
It is not American liberalism alone that would be altered by this new reading. For example, a habit well beloved more generally in America would come under question. The Second Amendment that 'a weA* re^u/afed" MiAtia bein^ necessary to tAe security o^ajree .State, tAe ri^At o^tAe peopYe to Aeep and" bear /Irms sAaA* not be in/rin^ed" has been taken as a general licence for o private firearms. The most natural interpretation of this prohibition that citizens should continue to have weapons in order that there should be a sufficiency of them practised in military skills to man a citizen army implies that the right should be unimpeded to the extent that it facilitates a specific goal, rather than indicating that the Amendment O acknowledges an unqualified licence. This is, more importantly, a right that the development of more sophisticated military techniques has rendered obsolete for national defence. Though the Second Amendment made sense in its day as a means to 'the common defence', it is less obvious that the preamble nowadays admits such a practical inference; and it is not obvious that if arms produce violations of 'domestic Tranquility' they should be permitted at all.
CONCLUSION
These examples suggest that the preamble to the Constitution implies radical alterations in American political attitudes. But, more germanely for the present purpose, its principles illustrate a mode of reasoning. The principles specified in the preamble provide topics which it is the business of legislators, judges and pundits to pursue. We need to reason from the principles of the preamble to the Articles of the Constitution and its Amendments, or to matters we suppose to be present among the unenumerated rights of the people, and thence to the bearing of such considerations on specific issues. In other words, we need to read the Constitution of the US in a new way. @ The full version of this essay first appeared in 57 Cambridge [me /ournu/ (1998), 284-300. The author is indebted to the editor for permission to publish here.
